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THE GLOBALIZATION ERA AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS: WHAT EUROPE
COULD LEARN FROM THE UNITED
STATES AND VICE VERSA
Milena Sterio*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The conflict of laws, or private international law, 1 has always
been an area of scholarly disagreement. Choice of law rules tend
to differ from state to state and often tend to encompass differing
methodologies for different fields of law, such as tort law or con
tracts. In Europe, traditional bilateral rules as developed by the
great Savigny2 in the 19th century tends to persist. In the United
States ("U.S."), on the contrary, scholars have long since aban
doned the bilateral approach and have, since Currie's revolution
ary writings in the 1960's,3 attempted to come up with "better,"
more substantive-law oriented, approaches. While the two conti
nents seemed to have increasingly diverging points of view on the
conflict of laws, two recent phenomena might bring them back
together.
First, Europe has been under the increasing influence of Euro
pean Union ("E.U.") lawmakers, who have undertaken a harmoni
zation movement attempting to somewhat unify member states'
laws. The conflict of laws area has not escaped the harmonization
movement and will become increasingly subject to Brussels's regu
lations and directives. Thus, traditional bilateral rules will have to
adapt themselves in light of the new political reality in Europe.
Second, the conflicts field in general, be it in Europe or in the U.S.,
has been transformed under today's globalization trend. In other
* Associate, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton. This Article represents the views of
the author only and not necessarily those of her law firm. B.A., Rutgers College; J.D.,
Cornell Law School; Maitrise en Droit, Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne; D.E.A.
(Master's Degree) in Private International Law, Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne.
1 The terms "conflict of laws," "choice of law," and "private international law" will be
used interchangeably throughout this article. While the first two terms are more com
monly used in the U.S., the latter is frequently used in Europe and delineates conflict of
both adjudicative and of prescriptive jurisdiction together.
2 F. VoN SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DEs HEUTIGEN RoMISCHEN RECHTS (1849).
3 CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS (1963).
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words, with the rise of international commerce, traditional private
law conflicts are being replaced by public regulations clashes in
volving different states' economic or regulatory interests. 4 Thus,
the conflicts field might have to adapt itself both by trying to adopt
universal rules, applicable on all continents, and by trying to adopt
new methodologies capable of dealing with the complex conflicts
situation of the global village. European bilateral rules are not
likely to furnish interesting models, as they are already under at
tack in Europe itself, and because they do not provide a basis for
the application of foreign public law. However, two American
choice of law models, one developed by Lea Brilmayer, and the
other by Andrew Guzman, might provide some needed solutions.
In order to address these issues, Part I of this Article will
briefly discuss both Brilmayer's and Guzman's theories. Part II
will then address the harmonization movement in Europe, and Part
III will concentrate on the "publicization" of conflicts of law. Both
Parts II and III will also discuss the possibility of adopting
Brilmayer's and Guzman's theories in Europe as well as the U.S. as
universal conflicts models capable of resolving modern-day legal
system collisions. Finally, Part IV will discuss conflicts of economic
regulations and the disappearing taboo of public law conflicts rules.
I.

MODERN SOLUTIONS: LEA BRILMAYER AND
ANDREW GUZMAN

American choice-of-law remains a largely incoherent field
with different state rules and differing scholarly opinions and theo
ries. However, two recent models present novel ideas and distance
themselves from the Currie model or from any Currie-derived
methodologies. These two models include Lea Brilmayer's politi
cal rights theory and Andrew Guzman's economic law approach.
A.

Lea Brilmayer's Model

Lea Brilmayer's political theory of the conflict of laws is a vig
orous critique of Currie's governmental interests ideas. Brilmayer
proposes a new model based on fairness. 5 First, regarding her cri
4 This second phenomenon will be interchangeably described herein as "publicization"
of private international law or disappearance of the public law taboo. The latter expres
sion, "public law taboo," traditionally signified that in areas of public law, one country
could not apply another country's public law. Thus, public law was "taboo" in terms of
choosing the applicable public law.
5 Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989).
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tique of Currie, Lea Brilmayer underlines several problems in his
methodology. According to Brilmayer, interests are impossible to
ascertain and the whole process is unconstitutional. In fact, if one
were to adopt one of the methodologies suggested by Currie's suc
cessors, which consists of finding a state interest each time that a
law specifies its own territorial domain, and if the notion of interest
contains constitutional limits on the states' exercise of extraterrito
rial jurisdiction, then all of the above laws would be unconstitu
tional. 6 Furthermore, according to Brilmayer, it is not always
desirable to favor a substantial law policy over a conflict of law
policy. A legislator could have very well chosen to apply a foreign
law over his own law in order to foster conflict of law justice or
procedural economy.7 Brilmayer further illustrates her point ac
cording to which conflict rules should be as important as substan
tive rules. She gives as an example, procedural rules, which can in
themselves sometimes determine the outcome of a dispute. For ex
ample, jurisdiction-selection or statute of limitation rules can some
times prevent a claim from being introduced in a certain forum.
These outcomes, although they may seem un-just in certain cases,
are tolerated because procedural rules are deemed to be as impor
tant as substantive rules. 8 According to Brilmayer, conflict of law
rules are as important as procedural rules, and, relative to substan
tive rules, there is no need to systematically favor the latter.
Lea Brilmayer then suggests an alternative. According to her
political theory, a state cannot impose its authority and apply its
laws to an individual unless the individual has consented to the
state's authority either expressly or implicitly, or unless the appli
cation of the state's laws is territorial, implying a tie between the
state and the dispute. 9 In other words, the individual waives his or
6 Lea Brilmayer, 252 COLLECTED CouRsEs 9-252, at 11 (1995). Brilmayer refers to
the definition of "interest" proposed by H.H. Kay, which implies a constitutional standard
of limitation on the territorial application of each state's laws. Brilmayer then cites a para
graph from Currie's writings, which seems to suggest that the legislator should specify the
territorial reach of his own laws. From the two above remarks, Brilmay~r draws a constitu
tional critique - if the legislator specifies the territorial reach of his own laws, but if at the
same time there should be a constitutional limit on those laws' reach, then Currie was
trying to incite the legislator to adopt anti-constitutional laws. However, this critique is
somewhat tempered by Brilmayer herself, as the definition of "interest" is proposed by
Kay and not by Currie. For Kay's theory, see H.H. Kay, A Defense of Currie's Govern
mental Interest Analysis, 215 COLLECTED CouRsEs 9-204, at 13 (1989).
7 Brilmayer, supra note 6, at 12.
s Id. at 13.
9 See Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, supra note 5, at 1298-1308.
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her subjective rights. Instead of examining the privilege resulting
from the application of a state's laws toward an individual,
Brilmayer looks at the detrimental effects in order to examine the
burden that application of the same laws can have on the other
party. The authority and the foundation for the application of a
state's laws lie exclusively within the individual's willingness, ex
plicit or implicit, to subject himself to that authority. However, in
order to make sure that this choice of law model remains fair, and
to preserve distributive justice,10 Brilmayer introduces an addi
tional test of mutuality designed to balance choice of law outcomes
so as to avoid placing the burden systemically on the local party.11
Although Brilmayer herself admits that traditional bilateral rules
and the governmental interests model conform to the mutuality
test, 12 she discards those theories founded on states' interests in
order to re-position the debate in terms of subjective rights of
individuals. 13
Thus, Lea Brilmayer's political rights model embraces a new
perspective on the choice of law and sheds new light on traditional
conflicts ideas.
B.

Andrew Guzman's Model

The modern American debate regarding the conflict of laws
seems to have encompassed the rising globalization movement and
the development of international commerce. In fact, the modern
hypothetical situation examined by scholars no longer entails ve
hicular accidents or spousal privileges. Instead, the current para
digm focuses on economic disputes, on class actions in tort, or on
consumer protection laws - all of which imply both international
relations and extraterritorial application of a country's laws. In or
der to provide an adequate solution to these new conflicts, modern
10 The goal here is to establish a conflicts model that presents a burden to party A
while according a benefit to party B. See Dirk H. Bliessener, Fairness and Choice of Law:
A Critique of the Political Rights-Based Approach to the Conflict of Laws, 42 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 687, 696 (1994).
11 Id. at 697. ("To implement actuarial fairness in a choice of law model, Brilmayer
proposes an additional test of 'mutuality.' The mutuality test is even more restrictive than
actuarial fairness in that it requires a choice of law rule to be 'balanced on a case-by-case
basis."').
12 Id.
13 See id. For a European approach oriented toward individual subjective rights, see
QuADRI, infra note 86. For an implication of Brilmayer's theory on the modern debate
regarding the conflict of law, see infra Parts II and III.
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scholars have focused their attention on economic aspects: grosso
modo, how to efficiently allocate the territorial application of na
tional laws to optimize the global welfare. In other words, scholars
have focused on how to obtain economic efficiency through choice
of law rules in order to maximize global wealth.
The Law and Economics movement, developed mainly at the
University of Chicago under Richard Posner's remarkable influ
ence, seems to have implemented itself in conflict of laws theories.
Notably, Andrew Guzman from the University of Berkeley, 14 has
developed such a school of thought. According to Guzman, differ
ent states' interests need to be paralleled with those of the global
community in order to provide for an optimal repartition of na
tional laws for each international litigious situation. Because law
suits are increasingly becoming international, it has become
impossible to ignore the need for adapted choice of law rules.
Without a better understanding of how international choice of
law issues impact international business, the legal regime that
governs such transactions will stand in the way of economic de
velopment and growth rather than promote them. 15

Guzman's theory, founded on the quest for the optimization
of global resources, adopts a new methodology based on the legis
lative effect on individual welfare. Thus, the only relevant consider
ations in the choice of law calculus are the ones having effects on
such welfare.
Adopting maximization of global welfare as the objective imme
diately leads to the conclusion that the only basis of jurisdiction
to be considered is the impact of rules on the welfare of individ
uals. That is, factors that have no effect on human well-being
are ignored. 16

Guzman thus develops a new conflicts model. First, he seeks
to determine which substantive law is the most economically effi
cient, or the "global optimum." 17 Then, he analyzes different
states' behavior, as each state adopts a certain substantive policy
seeking to maximize its own fortune. In particular,Guzman exam
14 Andrew Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, School of Law, Boalt Hall, U.C.
Berkely Public Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 28 (1998), available at http://
www.ssm.com (last modified on November 8, 2000).
1 s Id. at 7.
16 Id. at 14.
17 Id. at 19. ("This is the set of substantive policies that would exist if a single benevo
lent and well-informed global policy maker were able to establish laws.")
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ines the relationship between the global optimum and different na
tional laws in order to establish that only the application of the
former would lead toward a satisfactory result in terms of maximiz
ing the global welfare. This model somewhat resembles
Brilmayer's quest for distributive justice: both authors strive to
avoid potentially negative effects of a national law while seeking to
balance the negative and the positive sides. In other words, the
application of a particular law is justified even if it is prejudicial
toward one party, if another party would benefit from it. The two
authors' points of view differ, however, as Brilmayer looks more
toward individual rights, whereas Guzman focuses on the economic
aspect and global welfare.
The Law and Economics movement's influence on American
choice of law theory has been significant over the last decade, and
scholarly enthusiasm over new models has recently blossomed.
The American conflicts revolution has also had considerable influ
ence on European choice of law scholars. However, traditional
European rules are still in place, despite their inability to adapt to
the new economic reality. In particular, two modern phenomena
have been threatening the European equilibrium in the conflict of
laws field. First, the E.U. has led a strong harmonization and unifi
cation movement over national laws, seeking to create a federal
union. The choice of law field might be obligated to follow the
same harmonization logic. Second, conflicts of law are becoming
increasingly public in nature. Thus, states' interests are increas
ingly more involved in this new type of litigation. The traditional
Savigny-developed model might be forced to adapt itself in light of
the publicization of private international law.
According to Lea Brilmayer, a state cannot exercise its adjudi
cative or legislative authority unless the individual implied in the
litigation has consented explicitly or implicitly to this state's au
thority. The territorial reaches of different states' laws implied in a
proceeding should be determined based on political fairness ex
amined from the individual's point of view. Furthermore, accord
ing to Andrew Guzman, the quest for the applicable law has to
encompass global interests, in order to find the most economically
efficient law and in order to foster global welfare. These new con
flict of law theories could possibly find their place in the new Eu
rope, harmonized and liberated of the public law taboo.
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THE "UNITED STATES OF EUROPE:" HARMONIZATION
AND CENTRALIZATION

Niboyet, an influential European scholar in the field of con
flict of laws from the beginning of the 20th century, advertised the
development of a certain federal union in Europe. 18 Europe
should have developed pursuant to a territorial principle according
to Niboyet. Countries should have abstained from applying their
national laws extraterritorially in order to respect other countries'
sovereignty. While the idea of constructing a federalized Europe
does not seem novel to the modern-day E.U. authorities, the way
that the latter have chosen to go about it differs significantly from
Niboyet's territorial ideas. In fact, current E.U. leaders are press
ing for a harmonization of national legal systems, a tendency that
has equally affected the conflict of laws area. Examples of such
harmonization include regulation of jurisdiction-selecting rules,
mandatory laws, and enforcement proceedings.
A.

Adjudicative Jurisdiction or Jurisdiction-Selecting Rules

First, with regard to adjudicative jurisdiction or jurisdiction
selecting rules, E.U. regulation has replaced the existing treaty law
in this field. The "Brussels I" Council Regulation of December 22,
2000, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters ("Brussels I Regula
tion"), 19 which entered into force on March 1, 2002, among mem
ber states of the European Union, 20 has effectively replaced the
Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968, on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
("Brussels Convention"),21 Europeanizing thereby a previously
treaty-based field of law. 22 The Brussels I Regulation is applicable
in both civil and commercial matters, as long as the defendant is
18 J.-P. Niboyet, L'universalite des reg/es de solutions des conflits est-elle realizable sur la
base de la territorialite?, 1950 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE
[R.C.D.I.P.] 509 (1950).
19 Council Regulation No. 44/2001, 2001 J.O. (L 012).
2o Denmark has not ratified the Brussels I Regulation. The Brussels Convention thus
remains applicable for Denmark.
21 11 OJ. EuR. CoMM. 32 (No. L 299) (1968); for the text of the amended version, see
21 0.J. EuR. CoMM. 77 (No. L 304) (1978).
22 For a discussion of the "Europeanization" of the Brussels Convention, see Droz &
Gaudemet-Tallon, La transformation de la Convention de Bruxelles du 27 septembre 1968
en Reglement du Conseil concernant la competence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et
/'execution des decisions en matiere civile et commerciale, 2001 R.C.D.l.P. 601 (2001).
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domiciled within the E.U. 23 In other words, a dispute becomes
"European" in nature if the party being sued is domiciled in E.U.
territory, despite the fact that both plaintiff and defendant could be
nationals of non-E.U. countries. The Brussels I Regulation effec
tively eliminates the need for forum shopping by harmonizing juris
dictional grounds among all E.U. countries. In fact, any E.U.
tribunal should come to the same conclusion regarding its own as
sumption of jurisdiction over a particular defendant if the dispute
is "European" in nature. National jurisdictional grounds are thus
superseded by the Brussels I Regulation.
It should be noted, however, that the Brussels Convention, in
force among E.U. member states before the adoption of the Brus
sels I Regulation, had already harmonized jurisdictional grounds to
some extent. Furthermore, under a 1971 Additional Protocol, the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ") had been granted jurisdiction
over all disputes arising under the Brussels Convention. 24 The har
monization movement, through the adoption of the above Brussels
I Regulation, expands the ECJ's jurisdiction even further because
this court now has automatic jurisdiction over all disputes in the
field of adjudicative jurisdiction as this area of law has become
"European. " 25 The adoption of new regulations in other areas of
law might similarly expand the ECJ's jurisdiction, rendering its role
comparable to that of the U.S. Supreme Court. 26
The role of the European Court of Justice, I take it, was inspired
in large part by the experience of the United States Supreme
Court ... [T]he basic function of the Court of Justice to see that
member states do not impair the flow of goods and persons as
mandated by the Treaty of Rome is consciously modeled on the
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to review ac
23 A dispute can also become "European" through the parties' intentions (see Article
23), or through one of the situations mentioned in Article 22, which provides for exclusive
jurisdiction. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 19.
24 See Brussels Convention, supra note 21.
2s The ECJ's new jurisdiction has been instituted under Article 68 of the Amsterdam
Treaty. It has effectively taken away the national courts' right to ask for a preliminary
ruling from the ECJ, a right that such courts had under the 1971 Additional Protocol. For
a more detailed discussion on the change in the ECJ's jurisdiction powers since the entry
into force of the Brussels I Regulation, see Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 22, at
627.
26 Regarding adjudicative jurisdiction, for example, nationality-based types of state ju
risdiction have been eliminated for all disputes arising under the Brussels I Regulation.
For example, in France, Article 14 can no longer be invoked against a defendant domiciled
in the E.U.
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tions that may interfere with the flow of interstate commerce
27

If the ECJ's jurisdiction is further expanded to include inter
pretation of all regulated areas of law, such as adjudicative jurisdic
tion, above and beyond its initial duties of supervising the free
movement of goods and persons established in the Treaty Estab
lishing the European Economic Community of 1957 ("Treaty of
Rome"), then this court's similarity with the U.S. Supreme Court
will become even more striking. 28 A harmonized Europe operating
under the supervision of a Supreme Court clearly parallels the U.S.
federation, begging the question of whether such harmonization is
also needed in the area of prescriptive jurisdiction or conflict of
laws.

B.

Mandatory Laws or "Lois de Police"

Second, the harmonization movement has already been under
taken in other areas of law, such as mandatory laws. The ECJ has
started to build a European regime of mandatory laws, or "lois de
police," stemming from its interpretation of Article 7 of the Con
vention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 1980
("Rome Convention"). 29 In a non-E.U. dispute, a judge is free not
to consider foreign countries' mandatory laws in light of the for
eign law's purpose and of the dispute's nature. Furthermore, such a
judge is also free to apply his own country's mandatory laws as he
pleases. In a European proceeding, however, the ECJ mandates a
proportionality requirement since its Arblade 30 ruling: the forum's
mandatory law, if it is neither lex contractus nor lex causae and if it
wants itself applicable, has to nonetheless conform to certain E.U.
27 Andreas Lowenfeld, Renvoi Among the Law Professors: An American's View of the
European View of American Conflict of Laws, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 99, 108 (1982).
2s It should be noted, though, that the U.S. Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction
over conflict of law issues. This area of law belongs to the common law of each state.
Since the famous decision of Erie RR., Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts
apply state law for all common law questions. The only possibility of acquiring Supreme
Court jurisdiction in a conflict of law issue would be to allege a violation of the Due Pro
cess Clause. See JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MuLTISTATE JusTicE 110-112 (1993).
29 23 O.J. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 266) (1980). The ECJ does not have jurisdiction to
interpret the Rome Convention because two 1988 protocols (C-27, 1988 O.J. 47 (1988)),
providing for this possibility, never became effective. The issue nonetheless remains im
portant in the conflicts arena regarding contractual matters, as long as the ECJ is compe
tent to decide on the applicability of E.U. laws and regulations, which also affect
international contracts.
30 Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/98, Arblade, 1999 ECR 1-8453 (1999).
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standards. 31 Under the Arblade holding, the applicability of a na
tional mandatory law could prove to be harmful to the free ex
change of goods as defined in E.U. law. In order for such a
mandatory law to be applied, its purpose has to be one of general
interest and its means have to be proportional to the goal that it
seeks to accomplish.
The proportionality criterion relates to the following scenario:
an economic operator is subject to two different regulations which
both have the same purpose; one in his home country and the other
in his host country. The ECJ suggests the idea of mutual recogni
tion as a solution to this situation. In other words, a host country
should not be allowed to apply its national law if its purpose is
already being fulfilled by the application of the home country rule.
Thus, the applicability of mandatory laws changes drastically when
the E. U. 's interior market is concerned. While a judge does not
have to justify the application of his own country's mandatory rules
in a non-E.U. dispute, the same outcome is not true for E.U. pro
ceedings. The free movement of goods goal inherent in the Treaty
of Rome trumps, to an extent, the application of the 1980 Rome
Convention. 32
This new regime of mandatory laws is further detailed in the
Mazzoleni3 3 decision, rendered by the ECJ on March 15, 2001.
The issue in this decision centered around the comparison methods
31 This case involved the posting of French workers to a work site in Belgium. The
conflict of laws involved mandatory workers' protection laws of France and Belgium.
Under Article 6 of the Rome Convention, a worker cannot be deprived of minimum stan
dards, which are imposed under the laws governing their working contracts. The law gov
erning the working contract is, under Article 6-2, the law of the place of performance,
despite a temporary posting elsewhere. In this particular case, the workers were "pro
tected" under French laws, as France was the regular place of performance under Article 6.
The mandatory Belgian law, however, seemed applicable under Article 7-2. It should be
noted that Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Decem
ber 16, 1996, concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of ser
vices was not applicable to this particular case, but that this fact did not have any
importance on the case's outcome. See id.
32 For another E.U. case discussing mandatory laws as they relate to commercial repre
sentation, see Case C-381198, Ingmar, 2000 ECR I-9305 (2000). In the Ingmar decision, the
ECJ decided on the applicability of mandatory laws derived from the Council Directive 86/
653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the Member States relat
ing to self-employed commercial agents (OJ 1986 L 382, p. 17). According to the ECJ, such
mandatory rules are applicable whenever the case in chief has close ties to the Community
[E.U.]. Id. Thus, agent-protective E.U. laws become mandatory laws or "lois de police"
under Articles 7 and 16 respectively of the Rome Convention and the Convention on the
Law Applicable to Agency of March 14, 1978 ("Hague Convention").
33 Case reprinted in 2 R.C.D.I.P. 495 (2001).
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of national mandatory rules that clash in an Arblade-type scenario.
The ECJ decided in Mazzoleni that the comparison should be
global: in harmonized areas of law, minor disparities in national
laws can no longer justify the non-applicability of a mandatory law
that is globally equivalent to another law. 34
Following the above two decisions, the European Group for
Private International Law35 suggested that a third paragraph be ad
ded to Article 7 of the Rome Convention in order to reflect this
new mandatory laws regime. According to this proposition, Article
7-3 would read as follows:
Effect may only be given to the mandatory rules of a Member
State to the extent that their application does not constitute an
unjustified restriction on the principles of freedom of movement
provided for in the treaty.

However, the latter proposition could prove to be insufficient be
cause the Arblade and Mazzoleni holdings undermine the very
purpose of conflict of law rules. 36 In other words, the respect of
E.U.'s free movement of goods principles might necessitate the
elaboration of new conflict rules for relations among E.U. coun
tries, while the already existing ones could remain applicable to
relations with non-E.U. countries. 37 The Rome Convention might
have to be Europeanized as well in order to reflect the creation of
a new European regime in the field of contracts. Other choice of
34 The Mazzoleni case involved a conflict between a mandatory French law and
mandatory Belgian law, which were both workers' protection laws. The events took place
before the entry into force of the E.U. directive of December 16, 1996, concerning the
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. It should thus be noted
that this type of mandatory law will be covered by E.U. laws and regulations in the future.
35 The European Group for Private International Law is a European-based think-tank
in the area of private international law. For more information on this group, see their
website at http://www.drt.ucl.ac.be/gedip/default.html (last visited on Mar. 22, 2005).
36 According to some authors, the ECJ reasoning in the Arblade, Ingmar and Maz
zoleni decisions is dangerous because the goals of protecting the free market relied on in
these decisions are over-broad, and because "to invoke such broad goals could render the
notion of mandatory laws too vague, as all European regulations could somehow become
linked to the E.U. Treaty goals." See Pataut (discussion of the Mazzoleni decision) (au
thor's translation), 3 R.C.D.I.P. 495; see also, ldot, Les bases communautaires d'un droit
prive europeen, reprinted in LE DRoIT PRIVE EuROPEEN 22 (Vareilles-Sommieres ed.,
1998).
37 Pataut, supra note 36, at 495 (Pataut trans.) (According to Pataut, "we should now
acknowledge that our substantive law encompasses mandatory laws of different sorts ('a
geometrie variable'), the applicability of which will vary depending on whether the dis
carded law is the law of a non-E.U. country or the law of an E.U. member state.")
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law theories might have to be examined in order to meet the needs
of a harmonized Europe.
C.

Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments

Third, European harmonization might also threaten existing
choice of law rules in other fields, such as the recognition and en
forcement of judgments. The 1968 Brussels Convention had al
ready adopted a lighter enforcement regime for member countries
in its Article 27. 38 In fact, enforcement of a foreign judgment can
only be challenged by fraud and/or disrespect of public policy,
whereas the judgment's substantive merits are no longer re
viewed.39 While Article 6 of the European Convention of Human
Rights served until now as an additional control mechanism on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Europe, 40 the
new harmonization movement might make the entire contradiction
moot.
In other words, Article 41 of the Brussels I Regulation proce
durally changes the enforcement regime of foreign judgments
within the E.U. Under Article 27 of the Brussels Convention, the
enforcement judge would automatically subject the foreign judg
ment to fraud and public policy reviews. However, under Article
41, such preliminary reviews no longer exist;41 if the judgment's en
forcement is disputed, only then will such a judgment be reviewed
by the enforcement judge under Article 33 of the Regulation. 42
38
39

Brussels Convention, supra note 21.
It should be noted however that for certain types of jurisdiction, such as those stem
ming from Article 16 or from articles destined to protect the weaker party, an automatic
review of the foreign judgment by the enforcement judge is established under Article 28 of
the Brussels Convention. See Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 22, at 644.
40 See Kromback {dee.), no. C-7/98, March 28, 2000. This case involved a German judg
ment which should have been enforceable in other countries under Article 27 of the Brus
sels Convention, but which was nonetheless denied recognition because it was contrary to
public policy under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
41 According to Article 41 of the Brussels I Regulation, "[t]he judgment shall be de
clared enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53 without any
review under Articles 34 and 35." According to Droz and Gaudemet-Talon, supra note 22,
at 644, "there is no more substantive review of the presented decision, just a formal regu
larity check." {Author's trans.).
42 The wording of Article 33 of the Regulation is almost identical to Article 27 of the
Brussels Convention. However, under Article 33, "[a] judgment given in a Member State
shall be recognized in the other Member States without any special procedure being re
quired. Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal
issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3
of this Chapter, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognized."
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This procedural change demonstrates the European orientation to
ward the suppression of enforcement procedures altogether. 43 The
Brussels Commission had initially elaborated a project on the Eu
ropean Enforcement Order, which was approved by the European
Parliament on April 8, 2003, and then adopted by the European
Commission on June 11, 2003. 44 Under this project, the competent
judge's decision could be executed anywhere within the E.U. with
out further enforcement proceedings. 45 The competent judge
would thus do away with enforcement as well, which would in itself
harmonize such proceedings in Europe by eliminating them
altogether.

D.

E. U. Checks and Balances Over Member States' Choice of
Law Rules

The harmonization of national laws within the E.U. in the
fields of adjudicative jurisdiction, mandatory laws, and enforce
ment proceedings, demonstrates the current orientation of Euro
pean decision-makers toward the federalization of European
states. Traditional conflict of law rules might no longer work in this
new federal model. Thus, conflict rules might have to be harmo
nized themselves, supervised by a European authority, and made
uniform within E.U. member states. Marc Fallon has said:
As long as a disparity among national private laws can, the same
as in the public law sector, prejudice free exchange, or as long as
the Community has received the normative power to protect
precise interests, such as those of the consumers, the elaboration
of a Community-based private law becomes possible. 46

European authors have suggested different checks and bal
ances mechanisms regarding the harmonization of national choice
43 See Droz & Gaudemet-Tallon, supra note 22, at 646 ("[M]aybe there is a remnant of
the idea of a 'European enforcement order,' with the only difference that within the Regu
lation's reach any national judgment will become a European enforcement order.") (Au
thor's trans.).
4 4 The original proposal was first sent to the European Parliament for its opinion on
April 18, 2002. The European Parliament approved the European Commission's proposal
subject to certain amendments on April 8, 2003, and the Commission adopted the
amended proposal incorporating the uncontested amendments on June 11, 2003. See http:/
/europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/133190.htm (last visited on Oct. 12, 2004).
45 This procedure will only be available for certain types of uncontested claims. For a
complete wording of this proposal, see http://europa.eu.int/cj/index.htm (last visited on
Oct. 12, 2004).
4 6 Marc Fallon, Les conflits de Lois et de juridictions dans un espace economique integre,
253 COLLECTED COURSES 9-282, at 15 (1996).
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of law rules. According to Marc Fallon, a national rule has to re
spect four different conditions in order to be compatible with the
European regime of free movement of goods, persons, and ser
vices. Such a national rule has to remain subsidiary to any derived
European regulations and has to have a legitimate purpose that is
of a general interest. In addition, the national rule cannot be dis
criminatory and must be proportional. Marc Fallon bases these
four conditions on his interpretation of a famous ECJ holding in
Cassis de Dijon, which instituted the home-country rule in the field
of free movement of goods. 47 Furthermore, according to Fallon,
each national rule has to respect the principles of subsidiarity and
non-discrimination, whereas the verification of the two other con
ditions (legitimate purpose and proportionality) would only take
place in particular cases, such as if a national rule is discriminatory
or if a national rule affects product importation and relates only to
product composition, but not to its sales particularities. 48
Regardless of the above discussion, any distinction between
public and private law rules would be futile according to this au
thor, as "the qualification of a rule as belonging to public law or to
private law is irrelevant, as long as there is a threat to free ex
changes under the European Community Treaty. " 49 The above
mentioned regime of E.U.-imposed checks and balances should
therefore remain applicable to private choice of law rules because
this regime is indifferent to the public-private law division. 50 Fi
nally, according to Falion, this controi mechanism over nationai
choice of law rules would enhance and strengthen substantive val
ues, underlying private international law, such as the encourage
ment of the international movement of judgments and the
protection of the "weak" party. The main goal should be, accord
ing to this author, the "enhancement of fundamental rights of the
47 Case 120178, "Cassis de Dijon," 1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979). According to Mr. Fallon,
this case holding has been extended to the free movement of services in Case C-76/90,
Sager, 1991 E.C.R 1-4221 (1991), and to the free movement of persons in Case C-106/91,
Ramrath, 1992 E.C.R. 1-3351 (1992). See Fallon, supra note 46, at 120.
4 8 According to Fallon, the above conclusion stems from the Keck case holding by the
ECJ. See Fallon, supra note 46, at 15; see also infra note 75.
4 9 Fallon, supra note 46, at 119. However, the same reasoning is not followed by other
authors, who argue that overbroad interpretation of the Cassis de Dijon holding might lead
toward the application of public law rules and standards to private law, which is unwar
ranted. See Vincent Heuze, I J.C.P. 152 (2002). However, in light of the public law taboo
disappearance, this debate becomes somewhat mooted. See infra Part III.
so For problems regarding the application of the home country rule to conflict of laws,
see Fallon, supra note 46, at 140-148.
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individual, rights to conduct economic activities or rights to a bet
ter quality of life." 51
Second, regarding the elaboration of uniform choice of law
rules, according to Fallon, this approach remains workable as well,
subject to certain institutional constraints, such as proof of neces
sity for an E.U.-based initiative and choice of an appropriate in
strument. Furthermore, according to Fallon, the E.U. zone should
be delineated with precision, for both harmonized areas of regula
tion and for the territorial reach of harmonized rules. Thus, E.U.
derived choice of law rules could lead toward the elaboration of an
interior market. For example, Fallon evokes recognition of judg
ments inside the E.U. - an area of law largely influenced by E.U.
led harmonization, as mentioned above.
According to Fallon, a certain degree of differentiation among
national substantive rules could also lead toward the realization of
the interior market. That is, because the E.U. would never be able
to develop a complete body of uniform substantive rules, the E.U.
has limited itself since the "new approach" 52 of the Single Euro
pean Act53 to those different rules that could avoid ECJ censure.
Such differences are "those related to national rules that have a
legitimate purpose, are of general interest and are proportional." 54
The proportionality principle entails an equivalency test that im
poses the application of the home country rule whenever two con
flicting national rules are equivalent. Thus, the need to harmonize
becomes almost moot as long as national rules are equivalent.
In terms of private international law, the new approach could
thus be defined as a limitation on the harmonization of substan
tial law rules to the minimum/core, while leaving the rest to
choice of law rules, as long as the designation of applicable law
contributes to the goal of interior market realization. In other
words, the EC legislator has been constrained, based on experi

5 1 Id. at 148. The same type of considerations characterizes the thought process of Lea
Brilmayer and her political theory of conflict of law. Brilmayer's ideas about individual
consent as a basis of legislative jurisdiction are somewhat parallel to Fallon's E.U. checks
and balances mechanism over national choice of law rules. Finally, the idea of E.U.-im
posed control resembles the constitutional supervisory role played by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
52 Council Resolution of May 7, 1985, 1985 0.J. (C 136).
53 Single European Act, 1997 O.J. (L 169).
54 Fallon, supra note 46, at 212.
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ence, to come back to a better method of reconciling jurisdic
tional legal systems. 55
Fallon claims that the elaboration of a "European" private in
ternational law is completely achievable through a European
checks and balances mechanism over national choice of law rules
and through harmonization of member countries' choice of law
rules. Fallon has thus identified two significant contributions of
European private international law to the general discipline of pri
vate international law. First, in terms of the latter's content, Euro
pean rules are applicable and exert control over both adjudicative
and legislative jurisdiction rules. Second, European rules lead to
ward the application of substantive or direct rules, and not choice
of law rules. 56 "The analysis of the 'acquis communautaire' 57 shows
that the possibility of establishing a European private international
law is achievable, and the multitude of EC regulations would al
ready allow for the elaboration of a European code." 58
One can only wonder about the similarities between the E.U.
and the U.S. federation; the two "unions" are composed of differ
ent states each having different private law rules. As different state
laws cannot - or should not - be truly harmonized, only certain core
areas of law are unified and the remaining rules are simply con
trolled by federal bodies and courts. In Europe, certain fields have
been harmonized, such as jurisdiction-selecting rules, mandatory
laws, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Furthermore,
the ECJ has been given the power and authority to control national
rules with regard to the principles of proportionality and non-dis
crimination. In the United States, federal law exists in certain areas
of law, and constitutional norms, such as the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the Due Process Clause, act as checks and balances
mechanisms throughout the Supreme Court's interpretation of
state laws.
Id.
Id. at 229-230. It should be noted that other scholars are actively debating the possi
bility of establishing a European Civil Code. See e.g. Fauvarque-Causson, Code civil
europeen, 2002 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE [R.I.D.C.] 403, Pierre
Legrand, Le sens et non-sens d'un Code civil europeen, 1996 R.l.D.C. 5319, Marc Fallon,
493 MELANGES COLBERT 1993, Commentary of September 13, 2001, of the European
Commission available at the European Commission website http://europa.eu.int/institu
tions/comm/index_en.htm (last visited on March 22, 2005).
57 "Acquis communautaire" is a French term that designates all of the already estab
lished progress within the E.U., encompassing legislation promulgated by E.U. lawmakers.
58 Fallon, supra note 46, at 229 (author's trans.).
55

56
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The parallel between the European and American systems re
mains schematic. However, the increased harmonization of na
tional laws in the E.U. might diminish the differences between
these two systems. Thus, Lea Brilmayer's or Andrew Guzman's
"American" choice of law models might tum out useful in a har
monized Europe. In other words, in order to harmonize and unify
national choice of law rules within the E.U., one might look to one
of these two models for appropriate solutions. If one were to fol
low Lea Brilmayer, the conflicts solution in the E.U. context would
entail focusing on the individual party to determine to which state's
authority the individual has explicitly or implicitly consented. If
one were to follow Andrew Guzman, the proper solution would be
to find the optimal national law from the E.U. perspective, rather
than from the perspective of any particular state. Regardless of the
chosen model, the goal of harmonization would remain fulfilled.
IV.

CONFLICTS OF ECONOMIC REGULATIONS AND THE PUBLIC
LAW TABOO

Despite the harmonization trend within the E.U., certain au
thors have noted a tendency to maintain traditional bilateral choice
of law rules in certain areas, such as public law economic regula
tions.59 However, the border between private and public law has
been greatly diminished in light of the massive development of ec
onomic regulations in the 20th century.
The assumption that the legal framework of international trans
actions, investments, and markets can exhaustively be explained
by the rules of private international law and some minimum
standards of public international law has clearly shown to be
erroneous. 60

Furthermore, according to Kurt Siehr, the European tendency
to follow American authors, such as Currie or one of his succes
sors, is even greater in the economic regulation domain. 61 In light
of the disappearance of the public law taboo in general, one could
conclude that the choice of law rules of the two continents might
become increasingly similar. As European scholars tend to toler
ate functional choice of law theories in the field of economic regu
lations, and as this field will certainly require elaborate and unified
59

Jurgen Basedow, Conflicts of Economic Regulation, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 423 (1994).
Id. at 423.
61 Kurt Siehr, Domestic Relations in Europe: European Equivalents to American Revo
lutions, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 37, 55 (1982).
60
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choice of law rules, one might also conclude that traditional bilat
eral choice of law rules will have to adapt themselves to this new
globalized area of law. The choice of law rules' adaptation might
be undertaken in the ways suggested by Lea Brilmayer or by An
drew Guzman in their choice of law theories. 62
A.

Conflict of Public Laws Paradigm

A classical private international law scenario involves a car ac
cident with victims coming from two or more different countries. 63
This scenario has been somewhat surpassed. The orientation of
modem private international law is focused on conflicts of public
law regulations and on a basis that would allow a judge to apply his
own - and presumably foreign - laws extraterritorially. This type of
conflict of laws is not novel in the United States and is being in
creasingly developed in Europe.
In the United States, conflicts of law that oppose American
"public" law and foreign law are resolved under the Restatement
of Foreign Relations Law, and not under the Restatement of Con
flict of Laws. 64 Public law conflicts were first experienced in the
U.S. in the area of antitrust law at the beginning of the 20th cen
tury. The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed this issue in the
American Banana v. United Fruit Co. decision, 65 where it stated
that U.S. laws should apply territorially, even if the effects of for
eign wrongdoing were experienced on U.S. territory. The shy ap
proach of the U.S. Supreme Court was abandoned in the Alcoa 66
holding, as territorial application of American laws no longer cor
responded to the economic reality. Thus, the Alcoa decision pro
vided for extraterritorial application of U.S. laws so long as two
See supra Part I.
For example, this fact pattern was involved in the Lautour case in France, Civ. May
25, 1948, 1949 R.C.D.l.P. 89, note Battifol, and in the Babcock v. Jackson case in the U.S.,
12 N.Y. 2d 473, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 191 N.E. 2d 279 (1963).
6 4 The mere existence of two Restatements demonstrates the traditional ideas accord
ing to which the same criteria could not be used to resolve public and private law conflicts.
However, the distinction between private and public law is less important in common law
countries than in civil law countries. For example, in the U.S., this distinction has been
greatly diminished through the Legal Realism movement at the beginning of the 20th cen
tury. Furthermore, a conflict paradigm involving American public law regulations and for
eign public law is analyzed under the concept of extraterritorial application of U.S. law,
and not as a traditional conflict of laws situation.
65 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
66 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945) [hereinaf
ter Alcoa].
62

63
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conditions were met. First, the alleged wrongdoing which took
place abroad had to have taken place with the intention to burden
U.S. interests. Second, the same wrongdoing had to produce a di
rect effect in the U.S. The Alcoa holding gave birth to the so
called effects doctrine, as the affected market obtained the judicial
green light to apply its laws to conduct situated abroad. 67
In order to temper the aggressive application of the lex Jori,
the U.S. Supreme Court further held in its Aramco 68 decision that
extraterritorial application of American laws should be limited to
situations where the legislative intent behind the relevant law
clearly pointed to extraterritorial application of the same law. Fi
nally, in its famous holding in Hartford Fire, 69 the Supreme Court
avoided this issue and decided to apply American law extraterrito
rially because, according to the majority, there was no real conflict
at stake. 70 In other words, only U.S. law was restrictive in this case
and was not in conflict with a merely permissive British law. Im
plicitly, the U.S. Supreme Court went back to the effects doctrine,
as in Hartford Fire where the foreign wrongdoing clearly targeted
the U.S. market. Finally, Sections 415 and 403(2) of the Third Re
statement on the Foreign Relations Law71 recognize a list of scena
rios where a judge can apply his own laws extraterritorially, under
the guise of "reasonableness," which is applicable to each hypothe
67 It could be argued that the Alcoa reasoning is nationalist, as it looks only to Ameri
can interests in order to justify the application of U.S. law, without examining other coun
tries' interests implied in the litigation. Thus, it might be preferable to use the
"reasonableness" test of the Third Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. See infra note
71, for an explanation of the reasonableness test.
68 EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company, 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
69 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
70 Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Hartford Fire argues against this approach. Ac
cording to Justice Scalia, the real issue was whether the U.S. Congress had the intent to
apply U.S. law, in this case the Sherman Act, extraterritorially. Congress acts in respect of
public international law. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, there are two rules of interpre
tation regarding national law: one stemming from ARAMCO implying a presumption
against extraterritoriality, and the other stemming from public international law, according
to which national law should be interpreted in respect of public international law. Accord
ing to Justice Scalia, public international law allows for the extraterritorial application of a
national law if this is reasonable. The second interpretation rule points in this case against
the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, as this would not be reasonable and as
it would violate public international law, which would be contrary to the second rule of
interpretation. For another example of case law referring to "comity" under public inter
national law with regard to the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, see
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N. T. & S.A., 549 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
71 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,

§§ 415, 403(2) (1987).
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sis, including the effects doctrine. 72 The Restatement's approach is
thus more moderate than American case law, as the Restatement's
approach recognizes the effects doctrine only if other countries' in
terests are respected, that is, through its acceptance of the reasona
bleness test inherent in public international law.
In Europe, the effects doctrine has never been officially recog
nized, but it has been used in case law. Most notably, it was used in
the ECJ's Woodpulp 73 case. In Woodpulp, the ECJ recognized the
possibility of applying European law to conduct located abroad
which clearly targeted the European market. The narrow holding
by the ECJ might be explained by the fact that the ECJ sought to
avoid ruling on a public choice of law issue as public law tradition
ally stands for territorial application of one country's laws. None
theless, both the ECJ's ruling in the Woodpulp case and the Third
Restatement demonstrate that the effects doctrine has soundly em
bedded itself in the field of public law conflicts. Thus, the public
law domain seems to provide similar choice of law solutions on
both continents, a phenomenon which might lead toward a certain
unification of choice of law rules in this area.
The opinio iuris as reflected by national legislation obviously
shifts towards the recognition of the effects doctrine, and this
cannot go unnoticed when rules of customary international law
are discussed. 74

72 "Reasonableness" implies a notion of fairness in public international law. In other
words, a state can only assert extraterritorial jurisdiction if this is "reasonable" and justi
fied, and if this doesn't interfere with other states' interests in a disproportionate manner.
The list of considerations to take into account in deciding whether exercising jurisdiction is
reasonable for a state includes:
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory [of the regulat
ing state]; the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the ac
tivity to be regulated; the character of the activity to be regulated, the impor
tance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regula
tion is generally accepted; the extent to which another state may have an inter
est in regulating the activity; the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 403 (1987). It should be noted that the above list is not
exhaustive.
73 Joined cases 89/85, Woodpulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, 5233, 5246 (1988).
74 Basedow, supra note 59, at 432.
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The Necessity for Different Choice of Law Rules

The choice of law rules used to adjudicate economic regula
tions' conflicts is thus different from the traditional Savigny-devel
oped rules. The inconvenience created for economic operators
from this paradigm stems from the cumulative application of many
potential laws. In other words, because the effects doctrine dic
tates a unilateral application of one country's laws, it puts the eco
nomic operator at the mercy of that country's laws as long as his
conduct somehow affects that country. Thus, economic operators
are potentially subject to several countries' regulations and laws.
Within the E.U., the ECJ has somewhat moderated this approach
through the adoption of the home country rule. However, this so
lution remains contentious both with European scholars and within
the same court. 75 Furthermore, it should be noted that relations
between E.U. countries and non-E.U. countries are not subject to
the home-country rule. Thus, certain authors have suggested the
establishment of bilateral choice of law rules in the field of eco
nomic regulations.
For example, Andreas Bucher suggests reconsidering the pur
pose and the content of bilateral rules in order to adapt them to
socio-economic needs. 76 According to this author, an example of
such rules would be Article 137 of Swiss Private International Law,
under which, in antitrust law, a damages claim based on conduct
which occurred abroad should be resolved under the foreign coun
try's laws. In the same manner, Articles 5 and 6 of the Rome Con
vention reflect the same idea of integrating the law's final purpose
in the choice of law mechanism. However, the establishment of
such bilateral rules is not desirable in all areas of law. 77 For exam
ple, in the field of economic regulations a judge applies his own law
as an agent of the state. Private interests, on the contrary, dictate
the application of foreign law. In fact, bilateral rules in this area of
75 Some European scholars, such as Vincent Heuze in France, are generally hostile to
the idea of expanding the Cassis de Dijon holding to the area of conflict of laws. Further
more, the holding in Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268-91, Keck, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097, has
modified the holding of Cassis de Dijon according to the same author.
76 See Andreas Bucher, L'ordre public et le but social des lois en droit international
prive, II COLLECTED CouRsEs 19, The Hague, (1993).
77 Basedow recognizes two types of situations where bilateral rules persist: first, if the
substantive policy behind a regulation can be fulfilled if the regulation's domain is limited
to intra-state situations, such as in the case of consumer and worker protection laws; sec
ond, in situations where states have accepted the political economy of other states, such as
in the context of a treaty or a union, like the E.U. Basedow, supra note 59, at 443-444.
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law do not provide for a basis for the application of foreign law.
"In a more practical sense the theory of bilateralisation cannot ex
plain why the foreign anti-trust law indicates an intention to be
applied should be decisive ...." 78
According to Basedow, the solution to economic regulations
conflicts can be found in the adaptation of unilateral rules so that
they can also provide for the application of foreign economic laws.
For example, Article 7-1 of the Rome Convention allows a judge to
take into account foreign laws. Under a similar logic, according to
Basedow, Article 7-1 reasoning should be applied to economic reg
ulations that are the lex causae. 79 Furthermore, the Third Restate
ment of Foreign Relations Law allows the competent judge to
examine other laws' applicability, including foreign economic laws
and the legislative interest behind those laws. Because bilateral
rules are ill-suited for public law conflicts and because there is a
need to find clear solutions in order to foster international com
merce, public law conflicts should be analyzed separately from pri
vate law ones. In order to develop a new system of conflict of law
rules for public law clashes, several solutions are possible. Accord
ing to Basedow, already existing unilateral rules should be adapted.
However, the solutions suggested by Lea Brilmayer and Andrew
Guzman look appealing too.
First, Lea Brilmayer's model might become appropriate for
several reasons. In public law conflicts, the application of the lex
fori tends to promote the state's interests. On the other hand, the
application of foreign law tends to promote individual justice and
parties' foreseeability, both of which are goals of private conflict of
law rules.
The same goal of individual justice and legal certainly prevails
when it comes to the application of foreign economic law; its
primary function is the harmony of decisions, the avoidance of
conflicts of obligations for the parties concerned, and the re
spect for the parties' expectations with regard to the applicable
law. 80

If one were to follow the above logic, it would seem more ap
propriate to look to the economic operators' expectations to deter
mine where they could have foreseen being sued. According to
Brilmayer, the application of a certain law toward an individual can
Id. at 440.
Id. at 442.
so Id. at 438.
78

79
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be justified either by the individual's consent or by territoriality. 81
The individual is supposed to have consented to the legislative au
thority of a certain country through an express accord or through
certain types of conduct from which such consent can be implied.
Under Brilmayer's terminology, an individual thus waives his or his
subjective rights. 82 In the economic arena, where the effects doc
trine already operates, one could thus imagine subjecting economic
operators to laws to which they have availed themselves volunta
rily. In other words, one could consider that parties to an illegal
pricing scheme have renounced their subjective rights to be left
alone 83 and that they implicitly consented to the legislative author
ity of all countries that are affected by their illegal conduct. In
stead of looking at the effects, one would thus look at the intention
of the alleged wrongdoing; instead of looking at the damages, one
would look at the cause of the same wrongdoing.
It should be noted however that Ms. Brilmayer's theory im
plies a reciprocity test, which is meant to assure a certain fairness in
the application of different states' laws. The reciprocity require
ment somewhat resembles the reasonableness requirement inher
ent in the Third Restatement and in some case law. 84 This logic,
already present in the U.S., seems fully exportable to Europe, at
least in the economic domain. 85 In light of the disappearance of
the public law taboo, nothing stands in the way of extending the
See Brilmayer, supra note 5, at 1298-1308.
Another basis of jurisdiction is territoriality, implying a connection between the reg
ulating state and the victim in a litigation proceeding. See Bliessener, supra note 10, at 696.
83 According to Brilmayer, there is a negative political right to be "left alone," which
imposes a limit on the state's exercise of its substantive legislative policy. Bliesener, supra
note 10, at 693.
84 See, e.g., Alcoa v. U.S., 148 F.2d at 416; and Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597; see also
Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 764.
85 According to German scholars, the ECJ's Centros holding of March 9, 1999, case C
212/97, reasons in terms of individual rights. This case involved the possibility for a Danish
couple to open a subsidiary of their United Kingdom-based company in Denmark. The
couple's company was based in the United Kingdom solely to avoid heavy taxation im
posed in Denmark. Denmark refused the registration of the couple's subsidiary because
the mother company's activities were going to be exercised in Denmark and because the
scheme constituted fraud under Danish law. This refusal was deemed incompatible with
articles 52 and 58 of the Rome Treaty according to the ECJ because of liberty of establish
ment. According to German scholars, the case involved a right to "justification" for the
parties. See Christian Joerges, On the Legitimacy of Europeanising Europe's Private Law:
Considerations on a Law of Justification for the E. U. Multi-Level System, Symposium, Eu
ropean University Institute (2002). The same reasoning that looks to individual rights is
similar to Brilmayer's theory of "waivers" and of the right to be left alone.
81

82

184

CARDOZO J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 13:161

same logic to the choice of law field, as some European authors
had suggested decades ago. 86
Some authors disagree with Brilmayer's ideas. In particular,
Bliessener underlines the contradiction between the systematic al
location of burdens to the local party in order to protect the for
eign party's right to be left alone and the reciprocity requirement,
which is meant to accomplish a goal of distributive justice, but
which is contrary to the burden allocation system. According to
Bliessener, this model, which is based on privileges accorded to the
foreign party in the name of respect of his or her negative rights,
implies a rule-selecting methodology, whereas the reciprocity re
quirement elaborated to correct the same model implies a jurisdic
tion-selecting methodology. Because the two methodologies are
incompatible, Brilmayer's model is incoherent and contradictory.
Bleissener critiques as follows:
The so-called 'negative rights' or 'rights to be left alone' play a
pivotal role in her theory of political obligation for choice of
law. She concedes the rule-selecting nature and, accordingly,
the redistributive result of the negative rights-based approach
. . . One part of her model suggest a rule-selecting, the other
takes a jurisdiction-selecting, approach to choice of law. One
part leads to redistributive result to the disadvantage of the local
party, the other pretends to cure this result and so tum it upside
down. One part of her model asserts a political fairness stan
dard, the other denies this very standard on behalf of fairness. 87

The above critique by Bliessener seems coherent. However,
Bliessener positions himself in an entirely private law logic, which
takes into account individual claimants but not the states' interests.
Negative rights presented by Brilmayer and critiqued by Mr. Blies
sener are about individual equality and fairness from a personal
perspective. From a public law perspective, however, the negative
right to be left alone relates not only to the economic operator but
also to his home country. Furthermore, Bliessener's critique is
confined to an internal logic, or in other words, to American intra
state conflicts. In the context of publicized private international
law, however, conflicts occur among international economic regu
86 Rolando Quadri had suggested an expectations theory, under which one looks to the
individual's expectations to see whether the individual could have reasonably foreseen the
applicability of a certain country's laws toward him. See generally ROLANDO QuADRI,
LEZIONI DI DIRITIO lNTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (1965).
87 Bliessener, supra note 10, at 698.
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lations. This type of conflict implies both states' interests and the
inevitable influence of public international law. Thus, the reciproc
ity requirement underlines the necessity to respect other countries'
sovereignty and to impose one's own legislation only if it is reason
able from a global perspective, as the Third Restatement sug
gests.88 The two considerations - the respect of negative rights and
the reciprocity requirement among countries - are no longer con
tradictory in a public law conflict situation. Lea Brilmayer's theory
thus becomes more important in the modern conflict of law area,
as it is universal and as it permits a "rapprochement" between the
European and the American continents.
Second, Andrew Guzman's theory is equally important. Mod
ern conflicts of public law often involve antitrust laws and other
types of economic and financial regulations. The type of interest
involved is often economic and focuses on the affected market or
country. This paradigm is exactly the one in which Andrew Guz
man develops his economic theory. 89 In other words, Guzman's
theory is aimed at resolving such conflicts in order to obtain the
global optimum, by explaining to the affected country that its own
laws might not be the most efficient globally. Guzman might not
call this "reasonableness" as does the Third Restatement on For
eign Laws, but his quest for the global optimum underlies an eco
nomic reasonableness. Guzman's reasoning works at its best in a
public law setting, where interests are governmental or economic,
and where relations are international and no longer domestic.
Furthermore, the effects doctrine has somewhat embedded it
self in this field both in Europe and in the United States. Guz
man's model would correct the effects doctrine by embracing an
economic reasonableness into it and by focusing on global, and not
national, effects. As Europe has been more willing to abandon
traditional bilateral rules in the public law context, and as the U.S.
has somewhat accepted this type of reasoning regarding public law
conflicts,90 Guzman's model might be more easily accepted in mod
ern-day conflict of laws on both continents. Thus, Andrew Guz
man's theory might unify European and American conflicts of law
88
89
90

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 71, at § 403.
See supra Part I. B.
In the antitrust area, American case law has already embraced the effects doctrine.
See, e.g., Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 764; see also Alcoa v. U.S., 148 F.2d at 416. Further
more, reasonableness is already inherent in the American RESTATEMENT (THIRD), see
supra note 71, and in some case law, see Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 597.
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in order to address the need for new conflict rules in a publicized
private international law arena.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a general matter, American influence in Europe in the field
of conflict of laws is more than evident in both traditional private
international law as well as in the more modern, E.U.-influenced
and publicized one. According to Siehr, three European tenden
cies have been developed under American influence: a case-by
case approach allowing distinctions between each individual situa
tion; a notion of material justice through the restrained better-law
approach present in certain European treaties; and a predomi
nance accorded to domestic law if this law has important ties to the
relevant dispute. 91 It seems logical to conclude that the two trans
atlantic methodologies have been mutually beneficial to one
another.
We Americans could profit from your conceptual prowess, your
ability to turn thoughts into statutes, your penchant for elegant
simplicity. We, in turn, can offer an emporium of hard-won em
pirical lessons. You Europeans call law a science. Let us then
proceed in the spirit of scientific inquiry rather than to keep re
citing the mantras learned from old masters. 92

Will choice of law ideas become more similar in the U.S. and
in Europe over time? Certain authors are hesitant to embrace this
notion. 93 However, such an evolution seems inevitable in light of
the evolution of modern private international law. Most notable is
the harmonization within the E.U. and the disappearance of the
public law taboo. Traditional bilateral rules, as described above,
are not likely to furnish helpful solutions because of both their vul
nerability in front of Brussels lawmakers and because of their in
ability to justify the application of foreign public law. Thus, Lea
See Siehr, supra note 61, at 71.
28, at 133.
note 27, at 115 ("It seems to me that choice of law is an inter
esting but not an orderly field, and I like it that way. I am quite prepared to live without a
unified system, provided there is a scope for imagination, subtlety, advocacy and persua
sion. If we conflicts lawyers can share those aptitudes across the ocean that unites us, I
think we have nothing to be ashamed of."). See also Bernard Hanotiau, The American
Conflicts Revolution and European Tort Choice of Law Thinking, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 73,
96-97 (1982). Hanotiau concludes that the theory of governmental interests is an Ameri
can product and cannot be exported in Europe. However, the same conclusion does not
necessarily apply to other theories or to Lea Brilmayer's and Andrew Guzman's models.
91

92 JUENGER, supra note
9 3 See Lowenfeld, supra
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Brilmayer's and Andrew Guzman's choice of law models might
provide useful ideas in the quest for more unified and universally
accepted solutions.
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